Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICEB 2009 Proceedings

International Conference on Electronic Business
(ICEB)

Winter 12-4-2009

Revenue Sharing with Multiple Airlines and Airports
Anming Zhang
Xiaowen Fu
Hangjun (Gavin) Yang

Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/iceb2009
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) at AIS Electronic
Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEB 2009 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS
Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

REVENUE SHARING WITH MULTIPLE AIRLINES AND AIRPORTS
Anming Zhang 1, Xiaowen Fu2, and Hangjun (Gavin) Yang3
Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC,
Canada V6T 1Z2
2
Faculty of Business, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong
3
Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC,
Canada V6T 1Z2
anming.zhang@sauder.ubc.ca, lgtxfu@polyu.edu.hk, gavin.yang@sauder.ubc.ca
1

Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of concession
revenue sharing between an airport and its airlines. It
is found that the degree of revenue sharing will be
affected by how carriers’ services are related
(complements, independent, or substitutes). In
particular, when carriers provide substitutable
services, the sharing proportions might become
negative if horizontal substitutability is sufficiently
strong. In these situations, while revenue sharing
improves profit, it reduces social welfare. It is
further found that airport competition results in a
higher degree of revenue sharing than would be had
in the case of single airports. Nevertheless, the
airport-airline chains may derive lower profits
through this revenue-sharing rivalry, and the
situation is similar to a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma.
As the airport-airline chains move further away from
their joint profit maximum, social welfare rises
beyond the level achievable by single airports. Our
analysis also shows that the (equilibrium)
revenue-sharing proportion at an airport decreases in
the number of its carriers, and increases in the
number of carriers at the competing airports. Finally,
the effects of the pure sharing contract are compared
with those of the two-part sharing contract.
Keywords: Concession revenues; Revenue sharing;
Airport
competition;
Airport-airline
vertical
cooperation; Non-atomistic carriers
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concessions, and car parking and rental. For the last
two decades, commercial revenues have grown faster
than aeronautical revenues; as a result, they become
the main income source of many airports. At medium
to large US airports, for instance, commercial
business represents 75-80% of the total airport
revenue (Doganis, 1992). ATRS (2008) studied 142
airports worldwide and found a majority of these
airports derived 40-75% of their total revenues from
non-aviation services, a major part of which is
revenue from concession services (with large hub
airports relying, on average, even more on
concession income). Furthermore, commercial
operations tend to be more profitable than
aeronautical operations (e.g., Jones et al., 1993;
Starkie, 2001; Francis et al., 2004), owing partly to
prevailing regulations and charging mechanisms
(e.g., Starkie, 2001).
Paralleling the growth of concession revenues,
revenue sharing between airports and airlines is
getting popular in practice. As documented in Fu and
Zhang (2009), there are cases, such as Tampa
International Airport in the US and Ryanair in
Europe, where airports and airlines share concession
revenues.1 In many other cases, revenue sharing is
in effect when airports allow airlines to hold shares
or directly control airport facilities. For example,
Terminal 2 of Munich airport was jointly invested by
the airport operating company FMG (60%) and
Lufthansa (40%), which is the airport’s dominant
carrier (Kuchinke and Sickmann, 2005). Commercial
profits generated from this terminal are thus shared
between FMG and Lufthansa. Fu and Zhang (2009)
found that concession revenue sharing has important
competitive and welfare implications: it allows the
airport and airlines to internalize a multi-output

1. Introduction
An airport derives revenue from two facets of
business: the traditional aeronautical operations and
the commercial (concession) operations. The former
refer to aviation activities associated with runways,
aircraft parking and terminals, whereas the latter
refer to non-aeronautical activities occurring within
terminals and on airport land, including terminal

1

Tampa International Airport has been sharing revenue with its
carriers for several years. In 2004, it shared $7 million out of a
total budget of $30 million (see the 2004 Annual Report of Tampa
International Airport). On the other hand, Ryanair has identified
airport car parking as one of its business opportunities and
cooperated with the leading airport parking company BCP. In its
negotiations with some airports, Ryanair asked for parking
revenue sharing as a condition to serve the airports (Fu and Zhang,
2009).
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complementarity between the passenger flights and
the concession consumption brought about by the
flights, which may improve welfare. Essentially,
passengers traveling through the airport also create a
demand for concession consumption. As an airport
depends on airlines to bring in passengers, sharing
some of its concession revenues with the carriers
will encourage them to expand output, which may in
turn improve profit of the whole airport-airlines
chain as well as social welfare. However, revenue
sharing can cause a negative effect on airline
competition as an airport may strategically share
revenue with its dominant airlines, further
strengthening these firms’ market power. The US
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
expressed concerns over airports’ practice of offering
particular airlines favorable terms, because such a
special treatment of one particular airline may harm
competition in the (downstream) airline markets
(FAA, 1999). 2 Since 1995, the competition
authority of the European Union, and later the
European Commission, have ruled against several
major airports in Belgium, Finland and Portugal
concerning their practice of charging lower prices to
home carriers (Barbot, 2006, 2009a).

substitutable services, the sharing proportions might
become negative if horizontal substitutability is
sufficiently strong and the fixed (transfer) payments
between the airport and carriers are feasible (referred
to as the ‘two-part revenue sharing’). The negative
sharing allows the airport to penalize the
over-competing airlines so as to support prices in the
output market and improve profit. In these situations,
while revenue sharing improves the total
airport-airlines channel profit, it reduces social
welfare. If the fixed payments are not feasible, under
the resulting ‘pure revenue sharing’ the airport will,
for the cases of independent or complementary
services, share less concession revenue with its
carriers than would be under the two-part revenue
sharing. For the substitutes case however, the
sharing-proportions comparison between the two
types is in general ambiguous. In the special case of
negative sharing, the pure revenue sharing results in
not only a higher sharing proportion, but also a
higher welfare level if carriers are sufficiently
symmetric, than the two-part revenue sharing.

We find that the degree of sharing will be
affected by how carriers’ services are related to each
other. In particular, when carriers provide

Our second objective in this paper is to
investigate revenue sharing for multiple, competing
airports. In general, very few papers in the airport
literature have examined the case of competing
airports analytically.3 This is understandable given
the local monopoly nature of an airport. The
situation is changing, however. The world has
experienced a rapid growth in air transport demand
since the 1970s, and many airports have been built or
expanded as a result. This has led to a number of
multi-airport regions such as greater London in the
UK and several metropolitan areas in the US (e.g.,
San Francisco, Chicago, New York, Washington,
Dallas, Detroit, Huston, and Los Angeles) within
which airports may compete with each other. At the
same time, the dramatic growth of low-cost carriers
(e.g., Southwest Airlines in the US and Ryanair in
Europe) has enabled some smaller and peripheral
airports to cut into the catchment areas of large
airports. Starkie (2008) conducted an overview of
UK airports from the perspective of a business
enterprise. He concluded that effective competition
between airports is possible and a competitive airport
industry can be financially viable. Taken together,
these observations suggest that it is important to
investigate the effects of revenue sharing in the

2
Previous studies (e.g., FAA, 1999; GAO, 1997; Dresner et al.,
2002; see also Hartmann, 2006, for a useful review on the topic)
suggest that airline entry may be deterred if the dominant airline
controls key airport facilities. Apparently, such a strategy by the
dominant carrier would require at least implicit
consent/cooperation from the airport. In the US, large and medium
airports that meet a certain threshold of airline concentration are
now required to submit competition plans as mandated by the
‘Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century’ legislated in 2000.

3
For example, Fu and Zhang (2009) examined revenue sharing
only for a monopoly airport. The few exceptions include Gillen
and Morrison (2003), who examined two competing airports in
the context of a full-service carrier and a low-cost carrier. More
recently, Basso and Zhang (2007) provided a general examination
of airport competition with congestion and non-atomistic airlines
at each airport, and Barbot (2009a) examined airport-airline
interactions (collusion, in particular) using a spatial model similar
to that of Basso and Zhang. The issues of concession revenues and
revenue sharing were not considered in these papers.

For the last several years, the effects of vertical
relationships between airports and airlines have
received growing attention from researchers. In
addition to Fu and Zhang (2009), Auerbach and
Koch (2007) and Barbot (2009a, 2009b) found that
cooperation between an airport and its airlines can
bring benefits to the alliance members in terms of
increased traffic volume and operation efficiency. In
this paper we extend the previous work on
airport-airline vertical cooperation, focusing on the
effects of concession revenue sharing. More
specifically, we consider that carriers may provide
complementary, independent or substitutable
services, and that the proportions of revenue sharing
may be outside of the range of [0, 1]. The latter
allows us to compare alternative sharing
arrangements. Further, unlike the previous studies,
our analysis is conducted with general demand and
cost functional forms.
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airlines’ revenue from providing aviation service is

context of multiple, competing airports.

then given by R ( q1 , q 2 ) = p ( q1 , q 2 ) qi .
i

We find that airport competition will result in a
higher degree of revenue sharing than would be had
in the case of single airports. Nevertheless, the
airport-airline chains may derive lower profits
through this revenue-sharing rivalry: in effect, the
airports are trapped by the incentive structure of the
environment, and the situation is similar to a classic
Prisoners’ Dilemma. As the airport-airline chains
move further away from their joint profit maximum,
social welfare rises beyond the level achievable by
single airports. Our analysis also showed that airline
market structure can have a bearing on revenue
sharing arrangements at not only the airport in
question, but also its competing airports.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
sets out the basic model and examines the
revenue-sharing equilibrium for a single airport with
multiple airlines. Section 3 examines revenue
sharing for the general case of competing airports
with each having an arbitrary number of carriers.
Section 4 investigates the pure revenue sharing and
compares its effects with those of the two-part
revenue sharing. Section 5 contains concluding
remarks.

i

The revenue functions can be used to define
how one carrier’s output is related to the other’s.
There are three possible cases: i) Complements: two
airlines offer complementary services in the sense
that

R ij (q1 , q 2 ) = p ij (q1 , q 2 )qi > 0
, Rij ( q1 , q 2 ) > 0 ,
i

(1)

i.e., increasing carrier j ’s output increases both the
total and marginal revenues of carrier i (here, and
below, if the indices i and j appear in the same
expression, then it is to be understood that i ≠ j .)7
In the present context, services provided by a trunk
airline and a feeder airline – with their passengers
connecting at the airport – may be considered as
complements. Another example would be that two
airlines engage in some form of strategic alliances or
code-sharing arrangements (e.g., Brueckner, 2001;
Brueckner and Whalen, 2000.). ii) Independent
services:

R ij (q1 , q 2 ) = p ij (q1 , q 2 )qi = 0 ,

(2)

i.e., the airlines’ services are unrelated in demand.
(Note, in this case, that R j ( q1 , q 2 ) = 0 implies
i

2. Single Airport with Multiple Airlines
2.1 Basic model
Consider, in this section, that a single airport
provides aeronautical service to airlines, for which it
imposes a charge.4 In our modeling this charge is
represented by a per-passenger fee w (>0), and is
regulated and cannot be changed unilaterally by
either the airport or airlines.5 We have two carriers,
labeled as i = 1,2 , operating from the airport,
although the analysis and results extend immediately
to the n-carrier case (see, e.g., Section 3.2). They
i

face inverse demands p ( q1 , q 2 ) , which satisfy the
usual properties of

pii < 0 and

p11 p 22 − p 12 p12 > 0
6

with subscripts denoting partial derivatives. The
4

For example, at the Hong Kong airport this charge consists of
runway charge, aircraft parking fee, and terminal building charge,
with each component accounting for 68.7%, 6.6% and 24.7%,
respectively (Zhang and Zhang, 2003).
5
Since price discrimination (on aeronautical charges) by an
airport is prohibited by the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) rules, all airlines serving the airport face the same w.
6

While

pii < 0

indicates the usual property of

downward-sloping demands,

p11 p 22 − p 12 p12 > 0

refers to

the property of ‘own effects’ dominating ‘cross effects’ in demand

Riji (q1 , q 2 ) = 0 .) (iii) Substitutes:
R ij (q1 , q 2 ) = p ij (q1 , q 2 )q i < 0 ,
Riji (q1 , q 2 ) < 0 ,
(3)
i.e., increasing carrier j ’s output reduces both the
total and marginal revenues of carrier i . For instance,
two competing trunk carriers likely provide
substitutes at an airport, so do two competing feeder
carriers.
We consider that for each passenger going
through the airport, a (net) concession revenue h
(>0) is derived. 8 How this revenue is shared
functions. As noted by Dixit (1986, p. 108), the dominance of
own-effects over cross-effects is a standard assumption in models
of oligopoly.
7
The first inequality in (1) shows (gross) complements between
the airline services, whereas the second inequality implies
‘strategic complements’ (Bulow et al., 1985). That the former
implies the latter holds for most (but not all) plausible demand
structures; it certainly holds when demand functions are linear. In
other words, the fact that services are complements is conducive
to their strategic complementarity. Restricting attention to
strategic complementarity is a standard practice in oligopoly
models (Dixit, 1986; Tirole, 1988). Similar observations on
‘substitutes’ and ‘strategic substitutes’ hold for the substitutes case
discussed next. We shall, as is common in the literature, refer to
these two cases simply as ‘complements’ and ‘substitutes.’
8
This formulation of concession surplus has been used in, e.g.
Zhang and Zhang (1997, 2003), Oum et al. (2004) and Fu and
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between the airport and airlines is modeled as a
two-stage game. In the first stage, the airport offers
carrier i to share proportion ri of the revenue hqi

The solution to (5) yields the second-stage
equilibrium quantities, which are functions of the
first-stage variables ( r1 , r2 ) . (Since fixed payments

f i , subject to the

f 1 and f 2 enter the firms’ profit functions (4) as
constants, they won’t affect the equilibrium
quantities.) Denoting the equilibrium quantities as

in exchange for a fixed fee

9

carrier’s participation constraint. In this two-part
sharing arrangement, no restriction is imposed on ri ;
consequently, ri can be less than zero or greater
than one. In the second stage, airlines interact with
each other in Cournot fashion. 10 The subgame
perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game is referred
to as the ‘revenue sharing equilibrium.’
2.2. Revenue-sharing equilibrium
The revenue-sharing equilibrium is solved in the
standard backward fashion.
Stage two: Given sharing option ( ri , f i ) , each
carrier’s profit is:
π i (q1 , q 2 ) = R i ( q1 , q 2 ) − C i ( qi ) − wq i + ri hq i − f i , (4)
where C i ( q i ) denotes carrier

i ’s production cost.

Thus for carrier i , the total operating cost net of
fixed payment f i equals C i ( qi ) + wq i . The
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is characterized by the
first-order conditions,
π ii (q1 , q 2 ) = Rii (q1 , q 2 ) − C i' (q i ) − w + ri h = 0 , (5)
and
the
second-order
conditions

π iii (q1 , q 2 ) = Riii (q1 , q 2 ) − C i'' (qi ) < 0

.

Both

the second-order conditions and the stability
condition,
J ≡ π 11π 22 − π 12π 21 > 0 , are
assumed to hold over the entire region of interest.11
1

2

1

2

Zhang (2009). It is, nevertheless, a simple representation where
concession surplus is strictly complementary to passenger volume.
For an alternative and perhaps more realistic formulation, see
Czerny (2006).
9
Thus we investigate the effect of a ‘two part’ revenue-sharing
scheme under which fixed payments are possible. Such a model
can be used to examine the incentive for vertical airport-airline
cooperation – i.e., taking account of the profit for an
airport-airline channel as a whole – and may also be consistent
with situations in which airports and airlines can commit to
medium-/long-term cooperation. Nonetheless, such fixed
payments between airports and airlines might not be feasible in
certain situations, owing to the difficulty in their agreeing to the
right amount of payments, or to the preference for simpler
revenue-sharing arrangements that do not involve any
medium-/long-term commitment. We will, in Section 4, examine a
‘pure’ sharing contract that restricts fixed payments

fi

to zero.

10
Recent studies on airport pricing and capacity investment that
have incorporated imperfect competition of air carriers at an
airport (e.g., Brueckner, 2002; Pels and Verhoef, 2004; Zhang and
Zhang, 2006; Basso, 2008) have assumed Cournot behavior.
Brander and Zhang (1990, 1993), for example, find some
empirical evidence that rivalry between duopoly airlines is
consistent with Cournot behavior.
11
This assumption implies that the Cournot equilibrium exists
and is unique (e.g., Friedman, 1977). Note that if carriers face

qi* (r1 , r2 ) , substituting them into (5) and totally
differentiating the resulting identity with respect to
ri , we obtain

∂qi* / ∂ri = − hπ jjj / J ,
∂q *j / ∂ri = hπ jij / J .

(6)

It follows immediately that ∂qi / ∂ri > 0 , while
*

∂q *j / ∂ri having the same sign as π jij = R jij , which
by (1), (2) and (3) leads to:
Lemma

1.

∂qi* / ∂ri > 0 ; and (ii)

(i)

∂q *j / ∂ri > 0 , = 0 , and < 0 for carriers’
producing complements, independent services, and
substitutes, respectively.
Thus an increase in the share of concession
revenue to carrier i increases i’s output. The reason is
that an increase in ri will improve carrier i’s
marginal profitability, owing to the multi-output
complementarity between passenger flights and
concession consumption. Furthermore, an increase in
ri increases, not affects, and decreases carrier j’s
output if the carriers offer complementary,
independent, and substitutable services, respectively.
For the case of substitutes, since that

π jij = R jij < 0

ensures

a

downward-sloping

‘reaction function’ for each carrier (defined by (5) in
the output space), an increase in ri will, by
increasing carrier i’s marginal profit, shift its reaction
function outward. This will move the equilibrium
quantities downward along j’s reaction function,
*

thereby increasing qi

*

and decreasing q j . For

complements,

on

π =R >0

ensures an upward-sloping reaction

j
ji

j
ji

the

other

hand,

that

function for each firm. An increase in ri will again
shift i’s reaction function outward, moving the
equilibrium quantities upward along j’s reaction
*

function, thereby increasing both qi

*

and q j .

Finally, if the services are independent, then an
*

increase in ri does not affect q j , as expected.

linear demands, then all these conditions will be satisfied.
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Stage one: Revenue-sharing structures therefore
influence subsequent airline quantities, which in turn
will affect the airport’s profit. Assume, for simplicity,
that the airport’s fixed cost is zero and its marginal
cost is constant and normalized to zero. The airport’s
profit, denoted by Π , is then given by:12
Π = w ⋅ (q1* + q2* ) + [(1 − r1 )hq1* + (1 − r2 )hq2* ] + f1 + f 2 , (7)
where the second-stage equilibrium outputs are taken
into account. There are three components in Π : i)
the
aeronautical
revenue
(profit)
given
by w ⋅ ( q1 + q 2 ) ; (ii) the residual concession
revenue given by the bracketed term in (7); and (iii)
the fixed payment collected from carriers, f 1 + f 2 .

profit gain is due to the internalization of a demand
complementarity between the flights and concession
consumption. Further, even if ri = 1 , the profit will

The airport chooses ( r1 , r2 ) and ( f 1 , f 2 )
to maximize Π . While

f i won’t, as indicated

above, affect the second-stage equilibrium outputs,
∂Π / ∂f i = 1 by (7). Consequently, the airport
should, given its Stackelberg leader’s role, charge the
airlines a fee as high as possible subject to their
participation constraint π ≥ π 0 , with
i

i

π 0i

being

carrier i’s reservation profit, i = 1,2 . Assume,
without loss of generality, that each carrier receives
its reservation profit. (Hence, all the benefits from
improvements in performance go to the airport.) This
participation constraint implies, using (4), that

f i = R i (q1* , q 2* ) − C i (qi* ) − wq i* + ri hqi* − π 0i ,
i = 1,2 ,
(8)
*
where equilibrium outputs qi are functions of r1
and r2 . With (8), airport profit (7) becomes:
Π(r1,r2) = ∑i[Ri (q1*,q2*) −Ci (qi*) +hqi* −π0i ] ≡ v(q1*(r1,r2),q2*(r1,r2)). (9)

Thus,
the
revenue-sharing
equilibrium
characterized by the first-order conditions,
∂Π / ∂ri = vi ⋅ (∂qi* / ∂ri ) + v j ⋅ (∂q *j / ∂ri ) = 0 ,

i = 1,2 ,

is

(10)

where
vi ( ≡ ∂v / ∂q i ) = Rii ( q1* , q 2* ) − C i' (q i* ) + h + Ri j (q1* , q 2* )
. By (5), vi can be rewritten as:

vi = w + (1 − ri )h + Ri j (q1* , q 2* ) .

(11)

Consider first the case where carriers’ services
are independent. It can be easily seen from (10), (11)
and (2) that the equilibrium sharing proportions are
given by (superscript I for ‘independent services’):

ri I = 1 + ( w / h) , i = 1,2 ,

(12)

which are strictly positive. Revenue sharing
therefore improves the airport’s profit – here, the

rise with ri going beyond the ‘full’ share. Basically,
the two-part revenue sharing resolves the
well-known ‘double marginalization’ problem in a
vertical structure (e.g., Tirole, 1988).
The independent-services case turns out to be a
useful benchmark for the cases of substitutes and
complements. By first-order conditions (10) it
follows:

v1 ⋅ (∂q1* / ∂r1 ) + v 2 ⋅ (∂q 2* / ∂r1 ) = 0 ,
v1 ⋅ (∂q1* / ∂r2 ) + v 2 ⋅ (∂q 2* / ∂r2 ) = 0 ,

(13.1)
(13.2)

which give rise to

v2 ⋅ [(∂q1* / ∂r2 )(∂q2* / ∂r1 ) − (∂q1* / ∂r1 )(∂q2* / ∂r2 )] = 0
This equation, by (6), reduces further to
1
v2 h 2 (π 12
π 212 − π 111 π 222 ) / J = 0 ⇒ −v2 h 2 = 0 ⇒ v2 = 0.

v2 = 0 into (13.1) we immediately
have v1 = 0 . It follows from (11) that
ri = [1 + ( w / h)] + ( Ri j / h) , i = 1,2 .(14)

Plugging

If airline services are complements, then Ri > 0 ;
j

consequently (superscript C for ‘complements’),

riC > 1 + ( w / h) = ri I ,

i = 1,2 . (15)

If airline services are substitutes, then Ri < 0 and
j

so equation
‘substitutes’)

(14)

yields

(superscript

ri S < 1 + ( w / h) = ri I ,

S

for

i = 1,2 . (16)

The above discussion leads therefore to:
Proposition 1. At the revenue-sharing equilibrium
with a single airport, the sharing proportions are

ri I = 1 + ( w / h) when carriers’ services are
independent, i = 1,2 . The sharing proportions are
greater (smaller, respectively) than
carriers
produce
respectively).

complements

ri I

when

(substitutes,

The explanation for the deviations from the
independent-services benchmark is straightforward.
When services are complementary, the carriers are
unable to internalize such complementarity by
themselves. However, the airport, as a first mover,
can achieve this by manipulating revenue-sharing
proportions – here, by increasing the sharing
I

12
Throughout the paper, we use capital letter Π to denote
airport profit, while lower case π denoting airline profit.

proportions beyond ri . In the substitutes case, on
the other hand, horizontal (output) substitutability

The 9th International Conference on Electronic Business, Macau, November 30 - December 4, 2009

988

Zhang, Fu, Yang

will lead to a failure of coordination between
competing airlines, resulting in their producing too
much with respect to what would be best for them as
a whole. Anticipating this, the airport uses revenue
sharing as a device to coordinate airline competition
downstream. In particular, a smaller sharing
proportion than the independent-services benchmark
will, by Lemma 1, reduce industry output, thus
lessening excessive production by carriers.
It is important to point out that for the
substitutes case, the sharing proportions might
become negative. This is because horizontal
substitutability works in an opposite direction of the
flights-concessions
demand
complementarity
discussed above, in terms of the amount of
production the airport would like to induce. The
S

optimal level of revenue sharing, ri , is set to
balance these two effects. Thus, ri

S

depends on the

degree of substitutability between carriers’ services.
Numerical examples are constructed at the end of
this section, in which horizontal substitutability is so
strong that ri

S

become negative.

2.3 Comparison with the no-sharing regime
Our concern now is to compare the revenue-sharing
equilibrium with the situation where airport-airline
revenue sharing is not allowed, characterized
by ri = f i = 0 . First, for the cases of complements

and independent services, it is clear from Lemma 1
and Proposition 1 that revenue sharing will increase
output and improve profit. Define social welfare as
the sum of the airport-airline profit and consumer
(passenger) surplus:

W(r1,r2) =U(q1*,q2*)−C1(q1*)−C2(q2*)+hq1* +hq2* ≡ϕ(q1*,q2*),(17)
where U ( q1 , q 2 ) is the consumer utility function
in the usual industry (partial equilibrium) analysis,
with ∂U / ∂q i = p . Although passengers may
i

derive surplus also from their concession
consumption, such surplus per passenger is assumed
constant and further normalized to zero, thus giving
rise to formulation (17). Differentiating W with
respect to ri yields:

∂W/∂ri =(pi −Ci' +h)(∂qi* /∂ri )+(pj −C'j +h)(∂q*j /∂ri ).(18)
Since

p i − C i' > 0

(positive

markups

in

oligopoly), the output expansion identified above
leads immediately to ∂W / ∂ri > 0 and thus,
revenue sharing improves welfare.
As for prices, it can be easily seen (from below)
that they will fall if carriers’ services are independent.
For the complements case, the effect is not as

i

*

*

straightforward. Differentiating p ( q1 , q 2 ) with
respect to ri and r j yields

∂p i / ∂ri = pii ⋅ (∂qi* / ∂ri ) + p ij ⋅ (∂q*j / ∂ri ) ,(19.1)
∂p i / ∂rj = pii ⋅ (∂qi* / ∂rj ) + p ij ⋅ (∂q*j / ∂rj ) ,(19.2)
respectively. With carriers’ services being
complementary, the first term on the right-hand side
(RHS) of (19.1) is negative (recall pi < 0 and
i

Lemma 1) whilst the second term is positive.
Similarly, the first term on the RHS of (19.2) is
negative whilst the second term is positive. Under
‘symmetry’ however, the overall effects will be
negative for both (19.1) and (19.2), as is shown
below (Proposition 2). By ‘symmetry’ we mean (i)
carriers have identical cost functions and face
symmetric demands, and (ii) at the equilibrium,
carriers have the same sharing contract (i.e., r1 = r2
and f 1 = f 2 ). The symmetry condition will also be
used in the comparison for the substitutes case (see
Proposition 2).
Proposition 2. At the revenue-sharing equilibrium
with a single airport,
1. when carriers provide independent or
complementary services, (i) outputs and social
welfare are greater and (ii) under symmetry, prices
are lower, than in the absence of revenue sharing;
2. when carriers provide substitutable
services and are symmetric, (i) outputs and social
welfare are greater (smaller, respectively) and (ii)
prices are lower (higher, respectively), than in the

absence of revenue sharing if ri > 0 ( ri < 0 ,
S

S

respectively).
Proof: 1. We only need to show the price effect for
complementary services (the other parts have been
shown in the text). Use Δ to denote any difference
of variables between the revenue-sharing regime and
no-sharing regime. Applying the mean value
i

*

*

theorem (MVT) to the function p ( q1 , q 2 ) yields:

Δp i = pii ⋅ Δqi* + p ij ⋅ Δq *j ,
i

i

where pi and p j are evaluated at some point
O

O

C

C

between ( q1 , q 2 ) and ( q1 , q 2 ) , with
superscript O denoting variables associated with the
no-sharing regime. Under symmetry,

Δqi* = Δq *j > 0 from part (i). Consequently,
Δp i = ( pii + p ij )Δqi* < 0 with the inequality
following from the condition p1 p 2 − p 2 p1 > 0
and symmetry: noting that symmetry implies
1

2

1
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( pii + p ij )( pii + p ij ) > 0

reduces prices (or equivalently, expands outputs).
When carriers provide substitutable services,
revenue sharing may or may not improve welfare,
depending on the sign of equilibrium sharing

and hence

pii + p ij < 0 .
2. (i) Applying

qi* (r1 , r2 ) yields

MVT to

Δqi* = (∂qi* / ∂ri )Δri + (∂q i* / ∂r j )Δr j ,
with ∂q i / ∂ri and ∂q i / ∂r j evaluated at some
*

989

*

S

proportions ri . As indicated above, the sign of ri

S

will in turn depend on the degree of substitutability
between carriers’ services. To capture such an impact,
we need to impose more structures on the model.13
Specifically, a linear (inverse) demand is specified:

point between ( r1 , r2 ) and ( r1 , r2 ) . Under

p i = 1 − bqi − kq j

symmetry, Δri = Δr j and ∂q / ∂r j = ∂q / ∂ri ;

k ∈ ( −b, b) , which ensure downward-sloping

consequently,

demands and the own price effects dominating the
cross price effects. It is clear that carriers’ services
are complements, independent and substitutes
when k < 0 , = 0 and > 0 , respectively. Carriers’
marginal costs c1 and c2 are constant

O

O

S

S

*
i

*
j

Δq = [∂ (q + q ) / ∂ri ]Δri = h ⋅ (π − π )Δri
*
i

*
i

j
ji

*
j

j
jj

.
Since

π jij − π jjj > 0

under symmetry and the

stability and second-order conditions, Δqi must

,

with

b>0

and

Δϕ = (ϕ i + ϕ j )Δq i* has the same sign as Δqi* ,

and c1 = c 2 . In the simulation, parameters are
chosen to ensure positive outputs and marginal
revenues.
Figure 1 reports the effects of airline service
substitutability, where we define k = m ⋅ b with
m ∈ (-0.1, 1). Thus, negative m indicates horizontal
complementarity, whilst for positive m, larger m’s
mean increasingly substitutable services. As
expected, the airport shares a high percentage of
concession revenue – r1 (= r2 ) greater than 1 –
with airlines when the latter produce complements
(m < 0) so as to internalize horizontal
complementarity.
The
(equilibrium)
sharing

because ϕ i = p − C i + h > 0 . The welfare result

proportions, ri , fall when airline services become

then follows from the above quantity comparison.

increasingly

*

Δri ≡ ri − ri = ri
S

have the same sign as
(recall ri

O

O

S

= 0 ).

For the welfare comparison, applying MVT to

ϕ (q1* , q 2* )
where ϕ i

in (17) yields Δϕ = ϕ i Δq i + ϕ j Δq j ,
*

ϕj

and

are evaluated at some point

(q , q ) and (q1S , q 2S ) . Under
Δq = Δq *j
.
Consequently,
symmetry,

between

O
1

*

O
2
*
i

'

i

i

*
1
i
i

*
2

p (q , q )
i
i
*
i
*
yields Δp = p i Δq i + p j Δq j , where p and
(ii)

p ij

are

Applying

MVT

evaluated

at

to

some

point

between

(q1O , q 2O ) and (q1S , q 2S ) . With Δqi* = Δq *j
under symmetry, Δp = ( p i + p j ) Δq i
i

i

i

*

has the

opposite sign as Δqi , because p i < 0 and, by (3),
*

i

p ij < 0 . The result then follows from the above
quantity comparison.Q.E.D.
Although some of the comparisons in
Proposition 2 are carried out under ‘perfect’
symmetry between the firms, a closer look at the
above proof indicates that small asymmetries won’t
undermine the results. Proposition 2 shows that
when carriers offer complementary and unrelated
services, revenue sharing between an airport and its
airlines improves welfare. The welfare improvement
arises because prices exceed marginal costs in the
oligopolistic airline market and revenue sharing

S

substitutable.

When

horizontal

substitutability becomes sufficiently strong, ri

S

turns into a negative value. Such a ‘negative revenue
sharing’ allows the airport to penalize the
over-competing airlines so as to support prices in the
output market and improve profit for the whole
airport-airlines channel. While carriers pay a higher
price (than airport charge w) per unit of output, they
are nevertheless compensated for with fixed
payments from the airport – noticing in the figure
that the fixed fee becoming negative.14 In such a
13

Examining how equilibrium results change with substitutability
(i.e., when airline services become more substitutable to each
other) is also important, since there are situations in which airports
or policy makers can ‘moderate’ such substitutability. For example,
only a few Asian cities are served by multiple airports and as a
result, low-cost carriers (LCC) are often forced to use the same
airport as competing full-service carriers (FSC). Recently, airports
in, e.g., Kuala Lumpur and Singapore chose to build separate LCC
terminals which offer lower quality of airport service with less
charge (Zhang et al., 2009). Such a measure would make LCCs’
services less substitutable to the services provided by FSCs.
14
The negative revenue sharing arrangement or its variants are
also observed in practice. There are cases, for instance, where
airports may make one-shot investments (for carriers) to offset
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case, the output and welfare (not shown in Figure 1)
with revenue sharing (the solid line in the figure) are
less than those in the no-sharing case (the dotted
line), as predicted by Proposition 2. Here, while
revenue sharing improves the total channel profit
(see the figure), it might reduce social welfare.
• The horizontal axis corresponds to
substitutability parameter m, with k = m ⋅ b ,
m ∈ (-0.1, 1)
• — Solid Line: Results with share revenue
• … Dotted Line: Results without revenue
sharing.

Taking the second-stage equilibrium outputs
into account, each airport’s profit in stage 1 are
expressed,

Π i = wqi* + (1 − ri )hqi* + f i , i = 1,2 .

(20)

The subgame perfect equilibrium then arises when
each airport chooses its sharing contract ( ri , f i ) to
maximize Π , taking its rival’s sharing contract at
the equilibrium values. This revenue-sharing
equilibrium with airport competition will be referred
to as the ‘rivalry (revenue sharing) equilibrium.’
Without loss of generality the carriers are again
i

assumed to receive their reservation profits π 0 ,
i

3. Competing Airports
3.1 Strategic revenue sharing
We now consider two airports, represented
by i = 1,2 , beginning with a situation of one carrier
at each airport. (The case of multiple airlines will be
considered in Section 3.2.) To save notation we
i

continue to use p ( q1 , q 2 ) for the inverse
demands faced by carriers, with i denoting the ith
airport’s carrier (and qi its output). The two
airports compete with each other in the sense that
their airlines’ services are substitutes in the eyes of
passengers. More specifically, airline revenue
functions R (q1 , q 2 ) ( = p ( q1 , q 2 ) qi ) satisfy
i

i

i = 1,2 ; consequently, each airport’s profit can be
rewritten as:
Πi (r1, r2 ) = Ri (q1*, q2* ) − Ci (qi* ) + hqi* −π0i ≡ vi (q1* (r1, r2 ),q2* (r1, r2 )).(21)

The rivalry equilibrium is characterized by the
first-order conditions,

Π ii = vii ⋅ (∂q i* / ∂ri ) + v ij ⋅ (∂q *j / ∂ri ) = 0 ,

i = 1,2 ,
(22)
where subscripts again denote partial derivatives
(e.g., Π i ≡ ∂Π / ∂ri , vi ≡ ∂v / ∂qi
i

i

i

i

v ij ≡ ∂v i / ∂q j ).

and
From

(21),

vii = Rii (q1* , q 2* ) − C i' (qi* ) + h

the substitutes condition (3).
Airport-airline behavior is modeled again as a
two-stage game: In the first stage, each airport offers
its carrier to share proportion ri of concession

For the rivalry equilibrium, since v = R < 0 ,

revenue hqi in exchange for fixed fee f i , subject

∂qi* / ∂ri > 0 and ∂q *j / ∂ri < 0 , it follows by (22)

to the carrier’s participation constraint. In the second
stage, airlines compete in Cournot fashion with their
profits given by (4). Given this set-up, the
second-stage equilibrium is characterized by (5), the
same condition as in the single-airport case. Further,
the equilibrium quantities – denoted again as

that vi < 0 . Thus by (23), the equilibrium sharing

qi* (r1 , r2 ) – have the comparative-static properties
of Lemma 1: i.e., an increase in the sharing
proportion by airport i will increase its carrier’s
output while reducing output of the competing
airport’s carrier.

high airport charges. For example, Federal Express (FedEx) had
been planning to move its Asia Pacific operating center from
Subic Bay in the Philippines to Guangzhou in China since 2003.
However, FedEx was concerned about the high operating costs in
Guangzhou airport due to its high charges for fuel, airport and
ATC (air traffic control) services which are regulated by the
central government. To offset these high service charges and
attract FedEx, the airport agreed to invest US$300 million on
infrastructures including exclusive aircraft parking space and taxi
runways for the usage of FedEx. FedEx opened its Asia Pacific
operating center in Guangzhou in February 2009. It now has 136
flights per week at the airport.

which can by (5) be rewritten as:

vii = w + (1 − ri )h .

(23)
i
j

i
j

i

proportions satisfy (superscript R for ‘rivalry
equilibrium’),

ri R > 1 + ( w / h) , i = 1,2 .

(24)

It is interesting to compare this rivalry
equilibrium with the ‘non-rivalry (revenue sharing)
solution,’ which is obtained when the two airports
were perceived as independent in the sense that

p ij (q1 , q 2 ) = 0 . It can be easily seen from (22)-(23)
that the non-rivalry sharing proportions are given by
(superscript N for ‘non-rivalry solution’):

ri N = 1 + ( w / h) , i = 1,2 .

(25)

Comparing (25) with (24) leads to:
Proposition 3. The revenue-sharing proportions
are greater at the rivalry revenue-sharing
equilibrium
than
under
the
non-rivalry
revenue-sharing

solution,

i.e.,

ri R > ri N

for

i = 1,2 .
The non-rivalry regime is, from (25) and (12),
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similar to the case of a single (monopoly) airport
examined in Section 2, as expected: Like a
monopoly airport, each airport in the non-rivalry
regime
shares
positive
proportion

(iii) Applying MVT to Π ( r1 , r2 ) , given by

ri = 1 + ( w / h) of concession revenue with its
N

carrier.

ri N

While

internalizes

the

flights-concessions demand complementarity, the
rivalry revenue sharing involves an additional term

δi

– i.e., ri = ri
R

N

+ δ i – which is unique to the

case of competing airports. Since this additional
effect works by indirectly influencing the behavior
of the rival airport-airline pair – which in turn will
improve profit of the airport-airline pair in
question – the rivalry revenue sharing may be
referred to as the ‘strategic revenue sharing.’
Proposition 3 therefore shows that airport
competition will, owing to this strategic effect, result
in a higher degree of revenue sharing than would be
had in the case of single airports.
Next, the rivalry equilibrium is compared to the
non-rivalry solution in terms of output, price, profit
and social welfare. Here, welfare is the sum of
passenger surplus and profits of the two
airport-airline pairs; hence, it takes the same form as
(17). The comparison results are stated as follows:
Proposition 4. Under symmetry, at the rivalry
revenue-sharing equilibrium, (i) outputs are greater,
(ii) prices are lower, (iii) airport profits are lower,
and (iv) social welfare is higher, than at the
non-rivalry revenue-sharing solution.
Proof:
Use Δ to denote any difference of
variables between the rivalry equilibrium and the
non-rivalry solution. Here, we just show parts (i) and
(iii); the proofs for parts (ii) and (iv) are similar to
those of Proposition 2.
(i) Applying the mean value theorem (MVT) to

qi* (r1 , r2 )
yields Δq i = (∂q i / ∂ri ) Δri + (∂q i / ∂r j )Δr j ,
*

*

*

with ∂q i / ∂ri and ∂q i / ∂r j evaluated at some
*

*

N

N

R

R

point between ( r1 , r2 ) and ( r1 , r2 ) . Under
symmetry, Δri = Δr j and ∂q i / ∂r j = ∂q j / ∂ri ;
*

*

consequently,

Δqi* = [∂ (qi* + q *j ) / ∂ri ]Δri = h ⋅ (π jij − π jjj )Δri
Since

π −π > 0
j
ji

j
jj

stability

and

Δq ≡ q − q
*
i

R
i

under symmetry and the
second-order

N
i

must

have

the

conditions,
same

sign

as Δri ≡ ri − ri . By Proposition 3, ri > ri
R

N

R

and hence qi > qi .
R

N

N

i

(21), yields ΔΠ = Π i Δri + Π j Δr j , where Π i
i

Π ij

and

ri < ri < ri
N

i

are
R

i

i

evaluated
(using

(r1 , r2 )

at

Proposition

3).

with
Since

Δri = Δr j under symmetry and
Δri ≡ ri R − ri N > 0 ,
it follows that

ΔΠ i = ( Π ii + Π ij )(ri R − ri N )
and

ΔΠ i < 0

hence

if

(and

only

if)

Π + Π < 0 . By (21) and symmetry, it follows
i
i

i
j

that

Π ii + Π ij = (vii + v ji )[∂ (q1* + q 2* ) / ∂ri ] ,
where

vii

v ji

and

are

evaluated

at

qi = qi* (r1 , r2 ) . By (23), vii = w + (1 − ri )h
which is negative given that ri > ri
Furthermore, since

N

= 1 + ( w / h) .

v ji = R ji < 0 (substitutable

airports) and

∂ (qi* + q *j ) / ∂ri = h ⋅ (π jij − π jjj ) > 0 ,
it follows that Π i + Π j < 0 .
i

i

Therefore, ΔΠ ≡ Π − Π < 0 .
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 shows that both airport-airline
pairs will derive lower profits through this
revenue-sharing rivalry: the rivalry results in their
producing too much, thereby depressing the prices
and profits. In effect, the pairs are trapped by the
incentive structure of the environment. If one
airport-airline pair ignores the possibility of strategic
use of revenue-sharing contracts while the other pair
shares revenue strategically, the first pair loses while
the second pair gains relative to the non-strategic
sharing arrangement. Here the situation is similar to
a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma. As the airport-airline
pairs move further away from their joint profit
maximum through such a revenue-sharing rivalry,
social welfare nevertheless rises beyond the level
achievable by single airports.
i

iR

iN

3.2. Multiple airlines
Section 3.1 studies the case of one carrier per airport.
We now extend the analysis to a situation where
there may be multiple competing airlines at each
airport. Our second objective in this section is to
show that the general demand structure used in
Section 3.1 can be generated through explicit
considerations of passenger behavior.
More specifically, our demand derivation
follows Basso and Zhang (2007) by considering an
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infinite linear city, where potential consumers are
distributed uniformly with a density of one consumer
per unit of length. Two competing airports are
located at 0 (airport 1) and 1 (airport 2) and there are
ni carriers at airport i, i = 1,2 (see Figure 2). At

1 p 2 − p1 V − p1
+
+
,(29.1)
2
8t
4t
1 p2 − p1 V − p2
Q2 = (1− ~
z ) + (zr −1) = −
+
.(29.2)
2
8t
4t

each airport, carriers produce homogeneous output,

From (29) the inverse demands are given by

with total output Qi =

∑k =1 qik
ni

and market

i

price p .
catchment areas
(adapted from Basso and Zhang, 2007)
The ‘full price’ faced by a consumer located at
0 ≤ z ≤ 1 and who goes to airport 1 is given by

p1 + (4t ) ⋅ z , where 4t (>0) represents the
consumer’s transportation cost from z to location
0. By choosing airport 1 or airport 2 (but not both)
the consumer derives the following respective net
utilities:

U1 = V − p1 − (4t ) ⋅ z ,
U 2 = V − p 2 − (4t ) ⋅ (1 − z ),

(26)

where V denotes (gross) benefit from air travel.15
Assuming everyone in the [0, 1] interval consumes,
then the indifferent passenger ~
z ∈ (0,1) is
determined by setting U 1 = U 2 , or

1 p 2 − p1
z = +
.
2
8t

(27)

Given that airport 1 also captures consumers at its
l

immediate left side, define z as the last passenger
on the left side of the city who goes to airport 1.
r

Similarly, define z as the last passenger on the
right side of the city who goes to airport 2. With the
uniformity and unit density of consumers, z

l

and

r

z are computed as:
V − p1
V − p2
l
r
z =−
z = 1+
,
.
4t
4t

(28)

The airports’ catchment areas are shown in Figure 2,
and their demands are computed as:
15

This is an ‘address model’ with positive linear transportation
costs, and the differentiation of the two airports is captured by
consumer transportation cost. Within a multi-airport region, for
example, passengers may not necessarily choose an airport with
cheaper airfare, but may go to a nearer airport – see the empirical
studies by, e.g., Pels et al. (2001), Fournier et al. (2007) and Ishii
et al. (2009). In addition to distance, other aspects of airport
differentiation may be captured by extending the present
formulation. For instance, Pels et al. (2000, 2001, 2003) have
shown, using a hypothetical example and later the San Francisco
Bay Area case study, that ground accessibility of an airport is the
most important factor in affecting airport choices in a
multi-airport market. Such differential ground access costs could
be addressed by introducing a new parameter to the net-benefit
functions (26).

Q1 = ~
z + zl =

p i (Q1 , Q2 ) = (2t + V ) − 3tQi − tQ j ,

i, j = 1,2 .
(30)
which take the linear functional forms. This demand
system has the properties of
pii = −3t < 0 , p11 p 22 − p 12 p12 = 8t 2 > 0 ,
and substitutes condition (3).
To solve the two-stage airport competition
game, we begin with an analysis of the second stage
when airlines engage in intra- and inter-airport
competition. Suppose for simplicity that carriers
have linear costs C ( q ) = F + cq . Consider first
that the two airports have the same number of
carriers, i.e., n1 = n 2 ≡ n . Then airline profits can
be written as:

πik(Q1,Q2,qik) = pi (Q1,Q2)⋅qik −F−cqik −wqik +rhq
i ik − fi . (31)
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is characterized by
first-order conditions,

∂π ik (Q1, Q2 , qik )
= pi − 3tqik − c − w + rh
i = 0,
∂qik
k = 1,..., n , i = 1,2 ,
(32)
(and the corresponding second-order conditions,
which hold as ∂

2

π ik / ∂qik2 = −6t < 0 ). Given the

underlying symmetry of this set-up, the equilibrium
quantities are easily obtained:

[3(n+1)ri −nrj ]h 2t +V −c −w
,
+
(2n+3)(4n+3)t
(4n+3)t
k = 1,..., n , i = 1,2 .

qik* (r1, r2) =

(33)

Back to the first stage of the game, each
airport’s profit is:

Π i = wQi* + (1 − ri )hQi* + nfi ,
i = 1,2 .

(34)
With the airline participation constraints, these
profits can be rewritten as,

Πi (r1,r2) =[pi (Q1*,Q2*) −c+h]Qi* −n⋅ (F +π0i ).

(35)

Hence the rivalry equilibrium is characterized by
first-order conditions,
i
Π=
t Qi* −qik* )]⋅(∂Qi* /∂ri)−tQi*⋅(∂Q*j /∂ri)=0,
i [w+(1−ri )h−3(
i = 1,2 .
(36)

From (36) the equilibrium sharing proportions are
obtained as,
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ri R = 1 +

largely expected, the other result, dri / dn j > 0 , is

w (8n 2 − 9)(2t + V + h − c)
,
−
h
n(20n + 21)h

R

i = 1,2 .

(37)

Notice from (37) that if n = 1 (each airport has one
carrier) then ri > 1 + ( w / h) = ri
R

N

, a result
16

obtained in Section 3.1 (see Proposition 3).

Further,

it follows from (37) that dri / dn < 0 ,

i = 1,2 :

R

i.e., the sharing proportions decrease in the number
of carriers serving the airports.
For the general case where airports 1 and 2 have
n1 and n 2 carriers respectively, the inverse
demands are given by (30), where Qi =

∑k =1 qik
ni

is the aggregate demand at airport i. Solving the
two-stage game yields:

w [(8nj +9)ni −9nj −9](14ni +15)(2t +V+h−c)
,
riR =1+ −
h
ni (280
ninj +297
ni +297
nj +315
)h
… i = 1,2 .
(38)
Note that when n1 = n 2 = n , the above expression
reduces to expression (37). From (38) it is
straightforward

to

show

that

993

dri R / dni < 0

and dri / dn j > 0 , leading to:
R

Proposition 5. At the rivalry equilibrium with n1

not obvious. Here, the explanation is related to the
‘number of competitors’ effect: An increase in the
number of firms serving at airport j, while holding
ni unchanged, would increase airport j’s output
share in the two-airport market. 18 To counter the
effect, airport i strategically raises the sharing
proportion so as to induce its carriers to commit to
greater output. This would credibly deter airport j’s
carriers from producing more output, which in turn
improves profit of the ith airport-airline chain. Finally,

dri R / dn < 0 for n1 = n2 ≡ n , indicating that as
n rises, the (negative) excessive-production effect
dominates the number-of-competitors effect.
Like Section 3.1 (which considers one carrier at
each airport) we can compare the rivalry equilibrium
with the non-rivalry solution – in the present case
however, each airport has multiple carriers. It can be
easily calculated that the non-rivalry sharing
proportions are equal to:

ri N = 1 +

i = 1,2 .

dri / dni < 0 and dri / dn j > 0 : i.e., the

so it extends the formula (25) to the case of multiple
airlines. Second, using (39) we obtain:

dri N
< 0 , i = 1,2 ,
dni

R

revenue-sharing proportion of an airport-airlines
chain decreases in the number of carriers at its
airport, and increases in the number of carriers at
the competing airport. If n1 = n 2 = n , then

dri R / dn < 0 .
The intuition behind dri / dni < 0 is similar
R

to that of Proposition 1 (the substitutes case): As ni
rises (while holding n j

constant) and airline

competition intensifies, the total industrial output
becomes increasingly excessive for the ith
airport-airlines chain. Anticipating this airport i, as a
first mover, has a greater incentive to discourage
such excessive production, which can be achieved by
a smaller sharing proportion.17 While this result is

16

This result can also be shown using demand functions (30) and
the property of their associated revenue functions

R ij = p ij qi = −tqi < 0 .
17
While the two results have similar intuitions, the present result
is nevertheless obtained in an environment of competing airports.

(39)

Note, first, that if ni = 1 , (39) reduces to (25) and

and n 2 carriers at airports 1 and 2 respectively,
R

w (ni − 1)(2t + V + h − c)
−
,
h
2ni h

(40)

that is, as the number of firms at a single airport
increases and hence (uncoordinated) production gets
increasingly excessive, the airport then has a greater
incentive to curb production by using a smaller
sharing proportion. This result is a clear extension of
Proposition 1 which considers the effect of moving
from one carrier to two carriers. Finally, comparing
(39) with (38) yields that ri > ri
R

N

for any ni

n j ( ni and n j can take different
values, i, j = 1,2 ): i.e., the revenue-sharing
and

proportions are greater at the rivalry revenue-sharing
equilibrium
than
under
the
non-rivalry
revenue-sharing solution. This extends Proposition 3
of Section 3.1 to the general case of multiple airports
with each having an arbitrary number of carriers.19
18
This ‘number of competitors’ effect is related to a well-known
result found by Salant et al. (1983): in a Cournot market, a merger
of two firms into one entity reduces the merger partners’ profit
(unless the merger leads to a monopoly). By internalizing part of
the effect that a firm’s quantity decision has on the rivals’ profit,
the merged entity sets its quantity too low, thereby yielding
market share to the non-participating firms.
19
Similarly, Proposition 4 (including the Prisoners’ Dilemma
result) can be extended to the n-carrier case. The derivation is
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4. Pure Revenue-Sharing Contract
So far our approach to revenue sharing has focused
on a ‘two part’ scheme under which an airport
chooses both a sharing proportion and a lump-sum
fee on its carriers for the right to share concession
revenue. While desirable for the airport-airlines
channel as a whole, such a fixed payment between
the airport and airlines may not be feasible in
practice, owing, e.g., to the difficulty in their
agreeing to the right amount of payment.
In this section we consider a ‘pure’ sharing
contract under which the fixed fee is constrained to
zero, while keeping the rest part of the model
unchanged. Using ‘hat’ to denote the pure
revenue-sharing equilibrium – i.e., ( rˆ1 , rˆ2 ) – these
sharing proportions are constrained by the carriers’
participation constraints. Unlike the two-part sharing
scheme, therefore, negative revenue sharing is not
possible since these carriers cannot be compensated
for with any fixed payments by the airport,
indicating rˆi ≥ 0 . Given these observations, the
effects of the pure revenue-sharing contract will be
compared to those of the two-part scheme as well as
the no-sharing regime.
4.1 Single airport
Consider first a single airport served by two carriers,
which provide complementary, independent or
substitutable services. The airport offers carrier i a
pure sharing contract with sharing proportion ri .

Each carrier’s profit is given by

subtracting ( 43.2) × ∂q1 / ∂r1 yields:
*

[ w + (1 − r2 )h][(∂q1* / ∂r2 )(∂q2* / ∂r1 )
−(∂q1* / ∂r1 )(∂q2* / ∂r2 )]
= h[q1* (∂q1* / ∂r2 ) − q2* (∂q1* / ∂r1 )].
[ w + (1 − r2 )h][(∂q1* / ∂r2 )(∂q2* / ∂r1 )
−(∂q1* / ∂r1 )(∂q2* / ∂r2 )]
= h[q1* (∂q1* / ∂r2 ) − q2* (∂q1* / ∂r1 )].
Further, by (6) we have
1
[ w + (1 − r2 )h][h 2 (π 12
π 212 − π 111 π 222 ) / J ]

= h[q1* (∂q1* / ∂r2 ) − q2* (∂q1* / ∂r1 )]
Since π 12π 21 − π 11π 22 = − J , it follows that
1

2

1

2

[ w + (1 − r2 )h]h = −[q1* (∂q1* / ∂r2 ) − q2* (∂q1* / ∂r1 )]
By Lemma 1,

∂q1* / ∂r1 > 0 and ∂q1* / ∂r2 = 0 and < 0
for independent and substitutable services
respectively, we must have w + (1 − r2 )h > 0 .
Similarly, it can be shown that w + (1 − r1 ) h > 0
for independent
Therefore,

rˆi I < 1 + ( w / h)
i = 1,2 .

and

substitutable

services.

rˆi S < 1 + ( w / h) ,

and

(44)
For complements however, we need to assume the
symmetry condition. Under symmetry, we have
w + (1 − r1 )h = w + (1 − r2 )h in (43.1), which

π i (q1 , q2 ) = Ri (q1 , q2 ) − Ci (qi ) − wqi + ri hqi ,

reduces to:

i = 1,2 .

[ w + (1 − r1 )h] ⋅ (∂q1* / ∂r1 + ∂q2* / ∂r1 ) = hq1* .

(41)

Because ∂q1 / ∂r1 > 0 , and

∂q1* / ∂r2 > 0 for

*

The stage-2 equilibrium quantities are characterized
*

by (5), and are expressed as qi ( r1 , r2 ) with

∂qi* / ∂ri and ∂q *j / ∂ri given by (6). Then, the
airport’s profit in stage 1 is

Π(r1, r2 ) = w⋅ (q1* + q2* ) + (1− r1)hq1* + (1− r2 )hq2* .(42)
The pure revenue-sharing equilibrium is determined,
implicitly, by first-order conditions,

∂Π / ∂r1 = [ w + (1 − r1 )h] ⋅ (∂q1* / ∂r1 )
+[ w + (1 − r2 )h] ⋅ (∂q2* / ∂r1 ) − hq1* = 0
∂Π / ∂r2 = [ w + (1 − r2 )h] ⋅ (∂q2* / ∂r2 )
+[ w + (1 − r1 )h] ⋅ (∂q1* / ∂r2 ) − hq2* = 0

,

(43.1)

.

(43.2)

Multiplying (43.1) by ∂q1 / ∂r2 and then
*

available upon request.

complementary

services,

we

must

have

w + (1 − r1 )h > 0 , and so
rˆiC < 1 + ( w / h) ,

i = 1,2 .

(45)

Proposition 6.
At the pure revenue-sharing
equilibrium with a single airport,
1. when carriers provide independent and
complementary services (assuming symmetric
carriers in the case of complements), both the
sharing proportions and social welfare are smaller
than at the two-part revenue-sharing equilibrium;
2. when carriers provide substitutable services,
both the sharing proportions and social welfare may
be higher or smaller than at the two-part
revenue-sharing equilibrium.

The proof is relatively straightforward and is
available upon request from the authors. For the
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cases of independent or complementary services, the
airport, being unable to charge the fixed fee under
the pure revenue sharing, shares less concession
revenue with its carriers than would be under the
two-part revenue sharing. This result follows directly
from comparing (44)-(45) with the sharing
proportions (12) and (15). This reduction in sharing
will, by similar arguments used in the proof of
Proposition 2, reduce social welfare.

Under the pure revenue sharing, an airport is more
concerned with total traffic volume, which
determines its profit margin, and wants to stimulate
the traffic with minimum revenue shared (recall that
the transfer-payment device is no longer available).
This implies that price elasticities of demand play a
very important role in the pure revenue sharing. In
particular, increasing the sharing proportion for a
carrier with large market share and output (as a result
of its competitiveness) would likely be more costly
than doing so with a fringe carrier. As can be seen
from the figure, an airport under the pure revenue
sharing shares less with firm 1 as it becomes more
competitive. While carrier 1’s output may be higher
or lower under the two-part revenue sharing than
under the pure revenue sharing, total output and
hence welfare are, at least for the parameter values
used in Figure 3, higher under the former than the
latter (note that here, the relevant range of
comparison is for rˆi ≥ 0 ). This is because, when

For the substitutes case however, although the
equilibrium sharing proportions are, by (44) and (16),
less than 1 + ( w / h) for both types of revenue
sharing, the sharing-proportions comparison between
the two types is in general ambiguous. In particular,
as indicated, while negative sharing is ruled out
under the pure revenue sharing, it is possible under
the two-part revenue sharing. In such situations, it
can be shown that the pure revenue sharing results in
not only a higher sharing proportion, but also a
higher welfare level if carriers are sufficiently
symmetric, than the two-part revenue sharing.
When competing carriers are asymmetric,
however, there is an interesting twist introduced in
the sharing-proportions and welfare comparison
between the pure and two-part sharing arrangement.
To illustrate the effect, numerical simulations are
called upon. More specifically, the demands are
specified as linear: p = 1 − bi q i − kq j with the
i

usual properties of bi > 0 and b1 , b2 > k . Carrier
asymmetry is introduced via (i) b1 ≠ b2 and/or
(ii) c1 ≠ c 2 . Without loss of generality, (i) we set

b2 = (b1 + k ) / 2 and so b1 > b2 (> k ) ; and (ii)
we fix c 2 and let c1 vary. The results are given in
Figure 3.
• The horizontal axis corresponds to airline 1’s
marginal cost c1 ∈ [0.25,0.7]
• — Solid Line: Results with the two-part
revenue sharing
• … Dotted Line: Results with the pure revenue
sharing.
As shown in Figure 3, when firm 1 becomes
more competitive (smaller c1 ), an airport with the
two-part revenue sharing will share more revenue
with this carrier, while reducing the proportion
shared with the other carrier (firm 2, not shown in
Figure 3). By further strengthening the increasingly
efficient carrier’s competitiveness with a higher
revenue share, and hence greater profit could be
generated in the airline market, the airport would
capture greater profit via the fixed transfer payment.
This is not the case for the pure revenue sharing.

competing carriers are asymmetric in costs and
demands, an airport under the two-part revenue
sharing has a tendency to influence the market
equilibrium toward the efficient direction, which
enhances social welfare.
Finally, the pure revenue sharing can also be
compared to the no-sharing regime. It can be shown
that at the pure revenue-sharing equilibrium, prices
are lower, and both outputs and welfare are greater,
than in the absence of revenue sharing. These results
hold irrespective of the carriers’ producing
complementary, unrelated or substitutable services.
The proofs are analogous to the proofs of
Proposition 2, with some of the results requiring that
carriers be reasonably symmetric.
4.2 Competing airports
Next consider two competing airports, each served
by one carrier. The stage-2 equilibrium quantities are
again characterized by (5) and are given
*

by qi ( r1 , r2 ) , which have comparative-static
property ∂qi / ∂ri > 0 , i = 1,2 . Then each airport’s
*

profit

in

stage

1

is Π ( r1 , r2 ) = wq ( r1 , r2 ) + (1 − ri ) hq ( r1 , r2 ) ,
i

*
i

*
i

and the pure revenue-sharing equilibrium
characterized by first-order conditions,

is

Π ii = [ w + (1 − ri )h] ⋅ (∂qi* / ∂ri ) − hqi* = 0 ,
i = 1,2 .
(46)
*
From (46) and ∂qi / ∂ri > 0 , it follows that
w + (1 − ri )h > 0 and so
0 ≤ rˆi < 1 + ( w / h) = ri N < ri R , i = 1,2 .
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The following results are then obtained (part 2’s
proof is analogous to Proposition 2’s):
Proposition 7.
At the pure revenue-sharing
equilibrium with competing airports,
1. the sharing proportions are smaller (greater,
respectively) than at the two-part revenue-sharing
equilibrium; and
2. under symmetry, (i) outputs and welfare are
smaller (greater, respectively) and (ii) prices are
higher (lower, respectively) than at the two-part
revenue-sharing equilibrium (the no-sharing
equilibrium, respectively).
Proposition 7 indicates that under airport
competition, the pure revenue sharing improves
social welfare relative to the no-sharing regime,
albeit less effective than the two-part revenue
sharing. In general, in terms of airfare, traffic volume
and social welfare, the pure revenue sharing with
competing airports lies in between the no-sharing
and two-part revenue sharing regimes. It is also
worth noting that unlike the ambiguous result for the
single airport, the pure revenue sharing
unambiguously entails a smaller sharing proportion
than the two-part revenue sharing.

the two-part revenue sharing, in terms of enhancing
welfare, over the pure revenue sharing.
Our second objective in writing this paper is to
extend the existing literature on airport-airline
vertical cooperation to the general case of multiple
competing airports with each having an arbitrary
number of carriers. We found that airport
competition will result in a higher degree of revenue
sharing than would be had in the case of single
airports. Nevertheless, the airport-airline chains may
derive lower profits through this revenue-sharing
rivalry: in effect, the airports are trapped by the
incentive structure of the environment, and the
situation is similar to a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma.
As the airport-airline chains move further away from
their joint profit maximum, social welfare rises
beyond the level achievable by single airports. Our
analysis also showed that the (equilibrium)
revenue-sharing proportion at an airport decreases in
the number of its carriers, and increases in the
number of carriers at the competing airport. Airline
market structure will therefore influence revenue
sharing arrangements not only at the airport in
question, but also at the competing airports.

5. Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the implications of
concession revenue sharing between an airport and
its airlines. Earlier studies show that such sharing
allows an airport to internalize the demand
complementarity between flights and concessions,
and may improve both the profit and social welfare.
We found that the degree of sharing will be further
affected by how carriers’ services are related
(complements, independent, or substitutes). In
particular, when carriers provide substitutable
services, the sharing proportions might become
negative if horizontal substitutability is sufficiently
strong and the fixed (transfer) payments between the
airport and carriers are feasible (the two-part revenue
sharing). The negative sharing allows the airport to
penalize the over-competing airlines so as to support
prices in the output market and improve profit. In
these situations, while revenue sharing improves the
total airport-airlines channel profit, it reduces social
welfare. If the fixed payments are not feasible, under
the resulting pure revenue sharing the airport will,
for the cases of independent or complementary
services, share less concession revenue with its
carriers than would be under the two-part revenue
sharing. For the substitutes case however, the
sharing-proportions comparison between the two
types is in general ambiguous. In the special case of
negative sharing, the pure revenue sharing results in
not only a higher sharing proportion, but also a
higher welfare level if carriers are sufficiently
symmetric, than the two-part revenue sharing. We
further found that carrier asymmetry tends to favor
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Figure 1. Revenue sharing vs. no sharing: Single airport with two carriers
(Parameter values: b = 0.00001, c1 = c2 = 0.45 , w = 0.05, h = 0.05)
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Figure 2. Consumer distribution and airports’
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Figure 3. Two-part revenue sharing vs. pure revenue sharing: Single airport with two carriers
(Parameter values: b1 = 0.00001 , b2 = 0.000085 , k = 0.00007, c2 = 0.55 , w = 0.1, h = 0.3)
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